Jones v. State of Maryland, No. 3, September Term, 2008.
The opinion is available here (pdf).
In an opinion filed today, the Court of Appeals upheld the finding of a Circuit Court judge that a six-year old child was competent to testify in a trial of child sexual abuse and second-and-third degree sexual offense charges.
In Maryland, trial judges have no discretion to admit the testimony of a witness who is not competent to testify. The traditional standard for competency is this: a witness must have an understanding and appreciation of the nature and obligation of an oath to tell the truth, and an ability to observe and describe the facts the witness is called to testify about. This test has been articulated in a variety of ways, but at its core it has four components: 1) that the witness understand the concept of “telling the truth”; 2) that the witness have a capacity to observe (at least at the time of the underlying event); 3) that the witness have a capacity to recollect the facts observed; and 4) that the witness have an ability to communicate, including the ability to respond to questions about facts in the witness’s testimony itself.
In cases where children are alleged to be victims of crime, their competency to testify is often disputed at trial. It is essential for defense attorneys to closely scrutinize the potential incompetency of a child to testify, particularly in cases tried before juries, where members of the jury may be sympathetic to a child’s inability to precisely recall an event.
As with all determinations of witness competency, and as Jones makes clear, trial judges have broad discretion to admit a child’s testimony as competent. The age of a child is not the test in Maryland for competency. Instead, the test is whether the child has enough intelligence to provide testimony of any value, and whether the child feels a duty to tell the truth.
In Jones, the trial court conducted a lengthy hearing to determine if the child was competent to testify. During the examination, the child was presented with slides of people holding various objects. The child was told what the people holding the objects were saying, and was asked to state which person was telling the truth. Without fail, the child chose the person in the picture wearing red. The trial judge recognized that “he has a very strong preference to red . . . [and] he did poorly.”
In its ruling, the trial court noted that “quite frankly . . . the slide show presentation . . . I’m not being derogatory, but the bell and whistle presentation, quite frankly did poorly.” However, the trial judge determined that the child’s performance on another part of the examination was sufficient to convince him that the child was competent to testify.
Applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, the Court of Appeals upheld the Circuit Court’s finding that the child passed the “truth v. lie” and “ability to observe and relate” portions of the competency test, and had a strong understanding of his obligation to tell the truth.
Posted by Brennan Sullivan and McKenna
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Monday, September 21, 2009
Court of Appeals Reverses – Defendant Improperly Advised Before Waiving Counsel
Brye v. State of Maryland, No. 127, September Term, 2008.
The opinion is available here (pdf).
In an opinion filed September 18, 2009, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and remanded the case for trial. The Court reversed because the defendant was improperly and inconsistently advised of the allowable penalties of the crimes he was charged with, prior to accepting the defendant’s waiver of counsel. The Court stated that this case exceeded its tolerant for insufficient advisements to a defendant before acceptance of a waiver of counsel.
As a background note, Rule 4-215 governs a defendant’s waiver of counsel. One provision of this rule specifically states that a judge shall “[a]dvise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any.”
In Brye, the defendant appeared at trial with his attorney. When the defense attorney requested that the trial date be continued, the defendant objected and fired his attorney. His case was tried later that day, and he was convicted of second-degree assault, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, having been inconsistently advised of the maximum penalty for the offenses with which he was charged (that is, two judges told him different things regarding the allowable penalties for his charges), the defendant’s waiver of counsel was valid, given that he was not convicted of any offenses whose penalties were improperly advised to him.
Below, the Court of Special Appeals had held that any error that may have been committed was of no harm to the defendant, given that he was properly advised of the allowable penalties for second-degree assault, the only crime for which he was convicted. The Court disagreed.
“Incorrect advisements commingled with correct ones, rendered by a series of judges, cannot be ignored simply because a defendant is not convicted of the implicated charge or charges. . . . The analytical focus of a Rule 4-215 argument is at the point in the proceeding when the waiver is accepted . . . not what happened at trial.”
Posted by Brennan Sullivan and McKenna
The opinion is available here (pdf).
In an opinion filed September 18, 2009, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and remanded the case for trial. The Court reversed because the defendant was improperly and inconsistently advised of the allowable penalties of the crimes he was charged with, prior to accepting the defendant’s waiver of counsel. The Court stated that this case exceeded its tolerant for insufficient advisements to a defendant before acceptance of a waiver of counsel.
As a background note, Rule 4-215 governs a defendant’s waiver of counsel. One provision of this rule specifically states that a judge shall “[a]dvise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any.”
In Brye, the defendant appeared at trial with his attorney. When the defense attorney requested that the trial date be continued, the defendant objected and fired his attorney. His case was tried later that day, and he was convicted of second-degree assault, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, having been inconsistently advised of the maximum penalty for the offenses with which he was charged (that is, two judges told him different things regarding the allowable penalties for his charges), the defendant’s waiver of counsel was valid, given that he was not convicted of any offenses whose penalties were improperly advised to him.
Below, the Court of Special Appeals had held that any error that may have been committed was of no harm to the defendant, given that he was properly advised of the allowable penalties for second-degree assault, the only crime for which he was convicted. The Court disagreed.
“Incorrect advisements commingled with correct ones, rendered by a series of judges, cannot be ignored simply because a defendant is not convicted of the implicated charge or charges. . . . The analytical focus of a Rule 4-215 argument is at the point in the proceeding when the waiver is accepted . . . not what happened at trial.”
Posted by Brennan Sullivan and McKenna
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